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to obtain the MGF of the instantaneous SNR at the combiner output.
Based on this result and applying the MGF-based method, the average
SEP has then been attained in terms of the distinct eigenvalues of
the Gaussian components and their associated algebraic multiplicities.
The approach has been applied to some special cases, such as the
dual-branch correlated and the independent multichannel case, and
agreements with previously reported results have been verified. Fur-
thermore, although the analysis focused on rectangular QAM constel-
lations, the proposed approach can easily be extended to other M -ary
modulation schemes.
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Comments on “Proving Reliability of
Anonymous Information in VANETs”
by Kounga et al.
Liqun Chen, Member, IEEE, and Siaw-Lynn Ng
Abstract—Three vehicle-to-vehicle communication schemes by
Kounga et al. (“Proving reliability of anonymous information in VANETs,”
IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 58, no. 6, pp. 2977–2989, Jul. 2009) were
recently published to address the issues of certificate management,
scalability, and privacy. We present a number of attacks on one of the
schemes. Our result shows that, contrary to what is claimed, this scheme
does not provide the following four security features: 1) authenticity of
a message; 2) privacy of drivers and vehicles; 3) reliability of distributed
information; and 4) revocation of illegitimate vehicles.
Index Terms—Anonymity, authentication, vehicular communication.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a vehicular ad hoc network, vehicle-to-vehicle communications
allow vehicles to exchange information about road or traffic condi-
tions, thereby enabling a safer and more conducive travelling envi-
ronment. Security requirements for such communications have been
studied by various authors and organizations, and we refer to [4] and
[6] for extensive overviews and references.
For the purpose of this paper, we first briefly review the following
four concerns in this context: 1) the authenticity of a message; 2) the
privacy of the drivers and vehicles; 3) the reliability of distributed
information; and 4) the revocation of illegitimate vehicles.
On the question of the authenticity of a message, one solution
is to ensure that a message originated from a legitimate source. In
the literature of vehicle-to-vehicle communications, this property is
achieved by using a cryptographic data chain, starting with a trusted
third party (TTP) and ending up with a message announcement. The
TTP distributes credentials to legitimate vehicles. One example of such
a TTP is a certification authority (CA), and the distributed credentials
are public key certificates (e.g., [4] and [6]). These vehicles use the
certified public keys to either sign an announcement or introduce
further credentials as part of the data chain. It guarantees that the
announced message has been created by a legitimate vehicle and that
the validity of the data chain is publicly verifiable.
In general, user privacy1 includes two aspects, namely, anonymity
and unlinkability. Anonymity of drivers and vehicles can be protected
by using pseudonyms that do not indicate their owners’ identities.
Unlinkability means that different messages sent by a vehicle should
not be identified as coming from one source. This property prevents
user tracking and profiling, and as shown in the literature, it can be
achieved by using different pseudonyms for different announcements
(e.g., [1] and [4]–[6]).
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The reliability of distributed information provides assurance to a
receiver that the received information on an event is a true report.
Normally, vehicles communicating with each other do not have a
strong trust relation. As suggested in the literature, message reliability
can be achieved by some threshold method, that is, the receiver only
accepts a message that has been confirmed by multiple vehicles (e.g.,
[2]–[4] and [7]).
The property of revocation means that, if a source is no longer
legitimate, it should not be able to send a valid message. There are
various methods to achieve this property. One example is to rely on
a trusted revocation authority who, for each vehicle, holds a piece
of information enabling him to retrieve the vehicle owner’s identity
from any anonymous message. If a vehicle is no longer legitimate, the
authority releases this information, and then, verifiers will reject all
messages from that vehicle, as addressed for a target in [4].
Three schemes were proposed in Kounga et al. [4], which achieved
various levels of security. The first, “basic,” and the second, “scalable,”
solutions address the problems of certificate and key management,
whereas the third, “optimized,” solution aims to provide the aforemen-
tioned four security properties: authentication, privacy (anonymity and
unlinkability), reliability, and revocation.
In the remainder of this paper, we will first briefly review the third
solution (which we will denote as the KWL scheme) and then show that
this solution fails to achieve any of its goals. We emphasize, however,
that we have only applied our attacks to the KWL scheme (the third
solution) and that they do not invalidate the other solutions, which were
proposed to address different issues.
II. KWL SCHEME
We now give an overview of this scheme. In the scheme, a CA uses
a master private key to generate multiple private keys, each of which is
given to a tamper-resistant black box associated with a vehicle. A black
box then uses its private key to generate multiple short-term certificates
for short-term public/private key pairs. This would provide a proof of
legitimacy. Unlinkability would be achieved by the constant updates
of the short-term certificates—messages broadcast while using one
certificate should not be linkable to messages broadcast using another.
The details of the scheme are as follows.
The CA holds a secret key K and computes a check value V =
h(gAK), where h is a one-way hash function, and g is a generator of a
group G of order q for some large prime q. Both A and K are large pos-
itive integers. It is assumed that the discrete logarithm problem in G =
〈g〉 is hard, which means that, for any polynomial-time Turing ma-
chine, solving this problem is computationally infeasible. The value V
and a certificate Cert{V }, which is signed by the CA, are available to
all vehicles. Each vehicle Ck (with index k) is equipped with a tamper-
resistant black box BBk. Other global parameters include m, which is
the maximum number of short-term key pairs that can be generated by
a black box, and lifeTime, which is the validity period of each such key
pair. Another hash function f is also available to all black boxes.
At the point of manufacture, the black box BBk is loaded with the
following values:
1) V and Cert{V };
2) sk, which is a secret value specific to BBk;
3) Pk =
∏m
j=0
f j(sk), where j is an integer, and f j(sk) denotes
an operation that takes the value sk as input and runs the function
f j times, i.e., f j(sk) = f(f j−1(sk));
4) Qk, which is a positive integer computed by the CA that satis-
fies the equation K = PkQk + rk, where rk is also a positive
integer;
5) grk ∈ G, where rk is computed by the CA as above and is only
known to the CA;
6) A;
7) global parameters, including g, h, f , m, and lifeTime;
8) other global conditions, including nbSignatures, which is the
minimum number of signed messages reporting on an event
that must be received for the report to be considered reliable,
and maxTime, which is the maximum duration in which these
messages must be received.
Note that the CA’s secret key K has to be chosen so that K  Pk
for all Pk.
Note also that the CA stores the value Rk = gArk as a piece of
revocation information. When the CA decides that the vehicle Ck is no
longer legitimate, the CA can revoke it by publishing this information.
To generate the short-term certificate to be used in the time interval
Ti, BBk chooses a secret random integer ai such that
Aairk mod Pk = 0
ai = ai+n for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}
n ∈ {1, . . . ,m− i− 1}.
It is not clear from [4] how Aairk is computed, since BBk does
not know rk. It could perhaps simply choose ai = lPk/A for some
random l.
The private key Ki for this time interval is then
Ki = AaiQk
m−i−1∏
j=0
f j(sk)
and the corresponding public key is Gi = gKi . The helper value Hi
and the value Li are also computed by BBk, where
Hi =
1
ai
m∏
j=m−i
f j(sk),
Li = g
Aairk
Pk
∏m−i−1
j=0
fj(sk)
.
Finally, BBk generates a short-term public/private key pair pubTi/
privTi and transfers them to Ck along with Gi, Hi, Li, and Certi,
which is a certificate for pubTi signed using BBk’s private key Ki.
To broadcast a message msg, Ck signs it with private key privTi
to get a signature, which is denoted {msg}privTi , and broadcasts the
following:
{msg}privTi , Certi, Gi,Hi, Li.
For verification, a receiver Ck′ (k′ = k) calculates V ∗ = (GiLi)Hi
and checks that h(V ∗) = V . If the equation holds, then Ck′ uses Gi
to check that Certi is correctly signed. If the vehicle Ck has been
revoked, the verifier can obtain the value Rk from the CA and verify
RkG
Hi
i = V
∗
.
The scheme aims to provide four security features.
1) Unlinkability. By changing Ki and associated values at frequent
intervals, the scheme prevents tracing of vehicles across the time
intervals.
2) Authentication. A valid signature provides assurance that the
message originated from a legitimate source.
3) Reliability. By using the tamper-resistant box BBk, it is guar-
anteed that each vehicle Ck is only given one valid short-term
public/private key pair pubTi/privTi in every time interval and a
maximum number m of such short-term key pairs in the lifetime
of the secret sk. This key generation control provides assurance
that multiple signatures on one event in the same interval must
come from multiple vehicles.
4) Revocation. By having the CA as a revocation agency, an illegit-
imate vehicle Ck can be revoked.
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However, in the next section, we will show that none of these goals
are achieved.
III. ATTACKS
We first show that the scheme does not achieve unlinkability. We
note that, for any i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}
KiHi = AaiQk
m−i−1∏
j=0
f j(sk) · 1
ai
m∏
j=m−i
f j(sk) = AQkPk.
Hence, we have gKiHi = gKjHj for any i, j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}. Since
this is a value specific to BBk (and Ck), and the values gKi and Hi
are broadcast with every message, an eavesdropper will be able to link
the activities of Ck across all certificate updates.
We show next that any adversary who has observed one legiti-
mate message can masquerade as a legitimate black box. Note that
verification of the legitimacy of a message is done by computing
V ∗ = (GiLi)Hi and checking that h(V ∗) = V . Hence, any observer
of a message can compute V ∗ from the broadcast information. After
obtaining V ∗, an adversary simply chooses values u and v and sets
K˜i, G˜i, H˜i, and L˜i as follows:
K˜i =uv
G˜i = g
uv
H˜i =
1
v
L˜i =
(
V ∗
gu
)v
.
The adversary may then generate a public/private key pair p˜ubTi/
p˜rivTi , construct a valid ˜Certi using K˜i, and send any message
msg as
{msg}
p˜rivTi
,˜Certi, G˜i, H˜i, L˜i.
A receiver would calculate
(G˜iL˜i)
H˜i =
(
guv
(
V ∗
gu
)v) 1v
= V ∗
and accepts the message as legitimate. Hence, the goal of authentica-
tion is not achieved.
Note also that the aforementioned “forged” short-term private key
K˜i and its associated values are indistinguishable from an “authentic”
key Ki and its associated values. The adversary can create as many
such keys as he wants in any time interval, and the total number of
such “valid” keys is not restricted to the value m. As a result, there is
no assurance that multiple signatures on one event in the same interval
must be created by multiple vehicles. The functionality of the tamper-
resistant black box can be bypassed completely. The scheme, therefore,
does not hold the property of message reliability.
Obviously, this adversary can survive under the revocation solution
of the KWL scheme, since it is not under the CA’s control. Any
illegitimate source in the CA’s revocation list can also escape from
being revoked by performing the same trick as this adversary does.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the KWL scheme does not achieve the goals of
authenticity of a message, privacy of drivers and vehicles, reliability of
distributed information, and revocation of illegitimate vehicles.
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A General Framework for Symbol Error Probability
Analysis of Wireless Systems and Its Application
in Amplify-and-Forward Multihop Relaying
Golnaz Farhadi and Norman C. Beaulieu, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—New exact single-integral expressions for the evaluation of
the average error probability of a wireless communication system are
derived for a variety of modulation schemes in terms of the moment-
generating function (MGF) of the reciprocal of the instantaneous received
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The expressions obtained form a framework
for performance evaluation of wireless communication systems for which
the well-known MGF-based performance analysis method cannot be used,
that is, systems for which the MGF of the instantaneous received SNR is
not known or cannot be derived in closed-form. Using the framework ob-
tained, the error probability performance in general fading of an amplify-
and-forward (AF) multihop relaying system with both variable-gain and
fixed-gain relays is then evaluated. In particular, a new expression for
the MGF of the reciprocal of the instantaneous received SNR of an AF
multihop system with fixed-gain relays is derived. Numerical examples
show precise agreement between simulation results and theoretical results.
Index Terms—Amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying, error probability,
moment-generating function (MGF), multihop transmission.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multihop transmission has emerged as a promising technique for
extending coverage, enhancing connectivity, and saving transmitter
power in wireless communications networks. In a multihop trans-
mission system, a source communicates with the destination through
several intermediate terminals called relays.
The theoretical evaluation of the average error probability of a
wireless communication system in fading is generally done using
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